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Summary. This paper develops a conceptual and methodological framework for the analysis 
and measurement of economic resilience. The working definition of economic resilience adopted 
in this paper is the "nurtured" ability of an economy to recover from or adjust to the effects of 
adverse shocks to which it may be inherently exposed. This concept is used to provide an 
explanation as to why a number of inherently vulnerable countries have attained relatively high 
levels of GOP per capita. The paper also presents a tentative approach aimed at developing an 
index of economic resilience covering four aspects namely macroeconomic stability, 
microeconomic market efficiency, governance and social development. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many small states1 manage to generate a relatively high GDP per capita when compared to other 
developing countries2 in spite of their high exposure to external economic shocks. This would 
seem to suggest, that there are factors which may offset the disadvantages associated with such 
vulnerability. This phenomenon was termed by Briguglio (2003) the "Singapore Paradox", 
referring to the reality that Singapore is highly exposed to external shocks, and yet this island 
state has managed to register high rates of economic growth and high GNP per capita. This 
reality can be explained in terms of the ability of Singapore to build its economic resilience. 
Economic vulnerability is well-documented in the literature from the conceptual and empirical 
viewpoints (see for example Briguglio, 1995 and 2003; Crowards, 2000; and Atkins et al, 2000). 
Most studies on economic vulnerability provide empirical evidence that small states, particularly 
island ones, tend to be more economically vulnerable than other groups of countries, due mostly 
to a high degree of economic openness and a high degree of export concentration. These lead to 
exposure to exogenous shocks, which could constitute a disadvantage to economic development 
by magnifying the element of risk in growth processes. Cordina (2004a,b) shows that increased 
risk can adversely affect economic growth as the negative effects of downside shocks would be 
commensurately larger than those of positive shocks. The high degree of fluctuations in GDP and 
in export earnings registered by many small states is considered as one of the manifestations of 
such exposure (see Atkins et al, 2000). 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section revisits the so-called "Singapore Paradox". 
Sections 3 and 4 deal with the definitions of economic vulnerability and economic resilience. 
Section 5 presents the preliminary results of an attempt to construct a resilience index. Section 6 
describes the potential uses of the resilience index while section 7 concludes the study with a 
word of caution relating to the interpretation of results. 
2. THE "SINGAPORE PARADOX" 
As aready explained, the "Singapore Paradox" refers to the seeming contradiction that a country 
can be highly vulnerable and yet attain high levels of GDP per capita. Bnguglio (2003; 2004) 
explains this in terms of the juxtaposition of economic vulnerability and economic resilience and 
proposed a methodological approach in this regard. In this approach economic vulnerability was 
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confined to inherent features which are permanent or quasi-permanent, while economic 
resilience was associated with man-made measures, which enable a country to withstand or 
bounce back from the negative effects of external shocks. Briguglio refers to this type of 
resilience as "nurtured". Cordina (2004a,b) presents a conceptual application of this approach by 
showing that saving and capital formation in an economy, which are responses to a state of 
vulnerability, can be important sources of resilience. 
On the basis of this distinction, Briguglio (2004) identifies four possible scenarios into which 
countries may be placed according to their vulnerability and resilience characteristics. These 
scenarios are termed as "best-case", "worst-case", "self-made", and "prodigal son". 
Countries classified as "self-made" are those with a high degree of inherent economic 
vulnerability, but which adopt appropriate policies to enable them to cope with or withstand their 
inherent vulnerability. Countries classified as "self-made" are those that take steps to mitigate 
their inherent vulnerability by building their economic resilience, thereby reducing the risks 
associated with exposure to shocks. 
Countries falling within the "prodigal son" scenario are those with a relatively low degree of 
inherent economic vulnerability, but which adopt policies that expose them to the adverse effects 
of exogenous shocks. The analogy with the prodigal son is that these countries, though "born in 
a good family", squander their riches. 
The "best-case" scenario applies to countries that are not inherently highly vulnerable and which 
at the same time adopt resilience-building policies. On the other hand, the "worst-case" scenario 
refers to countries that are similary inherently highly vulnerable and adopt policies that 
exacerbate the negative effects of their vulnerability. 
These four scenarios are depicted in Figure 1, where the axes measure inherent economic 
vulnerability and nurtured resilience, respectively. In this scheme the best situation in economic 
terms falls in quadrant II. The vulnerable small island states that have adopted resilience-building 
policies would fall in quadrant I. 
Figure 1 about here 
This method of defining vulnerability in terms of inherent features and resilience in terms of 
policy-induced changes has a number of advantages. Firstly, the vulnerability index would refer 
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to permanent (or quasi permanent) features over which a country can practically exercise no 
control and therefore cannot be attributed to bad governance. As such the index should not differ 
much over time. In other words, countries scoring highly on the index cannot be accused of 
inflicting vulnerability on themselves through misguided policy approaches. 
Secondly, the resilience index would refer to what a country can do to mitigate or exacerbate its 
inherent vulnerability. Scores on this index would therefore reflect the appropriateness of policy 
measures. 
Thirdly, the combination of the two indices would indicate the overall risk of being harmed by 
external shocks due to inherent vulnerability features counterbalanced to different extents by 
policy measures. 
Given that vulnerability refers to permanent or semi-permanent characteristics which render 
countries more prone to exogenous shocks, it is not expected that a country moves vertically 
along the quadrants of Figure 1. But horizontal movement is possible for those countries that 
adopt measures which build resilience and vice-versa. It would thus be possible for countries to 
switch between the worst case and the self-made classifications, or the prodigal son and the best 
case classifications through changes in their economic policies. 
By distinguishing between inherent economic vulnerability and nurtured economic resilience, rt is 
possible to create a methodological framework for assessing the risk of being affected by 
external shocks, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 shows that risk has two elements, the first is associated with the inherent conditions of 
the country that is exposed and the second associated with conditions developed to absorb, cope 
with or bounce back from external shocks. The risk of being adversely affected by the shock is 
therefore the combination of the two elements. The negative sign in front of the resilience 
element indicates that the risk is reduced as resilience builds up. 
3. ECONOMIC VULNERABIUTY 
Recent work on the economic vulnerability index (see Briguglio, 1995; 1997, Briguglio and Galea, 
2003, Farrugia, 2004) is based on the premise that a country's proneness to exogenous shocks 
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stems from a number of inherent economic features, including high degrees of economic 
openness, export concentration and dependence on strategic imports. 
Economic Openness. Economic openness can be measured as the ratio of international trade to 
GDP. A high degree of economic openness renders a country susceptible to external economic 
conditions over which it has no direct control. Economic openness is to a significant extent an 
inherent feature of an economy, conditioned mainly by a country's ability to efficiently produce 
the range of goods and services required to satisfy its aggregate demand. If a country's 
productive base is limited to a narrow range of products, it would have to rely on imports to 
service a substantial part of its expenditure needs and on exports to finance its import bill. 
It may be argued that openness to international trade may be influenced by policy. Practical 
experience has however shown that trade policies tend to influence more the composition of a 
country's external trade flows, rather than their size. It can be further argued that openness to 
international trade could be a source of strength, in that it may indicate that a country is 
successfully participating in the international markets. This argument however does not detract 
from the fact that by participating more actively in international trade, a country would be 
exposing itself to a larger degree of shocks over which it has relatively little control. 3 
Export Concentration. Dependence on a narrow range of exports gives rise to risks associated 
with lack of diversification, and therefore exacerbates vulnerability associated with economic 
openness. Again this condition is to a large extent the result of inherent features in the 
production base of an economy. Export concentration can be measured by the UNCTAD index on 
merchandise trade (UNCTAD, 2003: section 8). Briguglio (1997) and Briguglio and Galea (2003) 
devised an alternative index which also takes services into account. 
Dependence on strategic imports. Another facet of the exposure argument relates to the 
dependence on strategic imports, which would expose an economy to shocks with regard to the 
availability and costs of such imports. This variable can be measured as the ratio of the imports 
of energy, food or industrial supplies to GDP. Again, this condition is inherent in that it depends 
on country size, resource endowments and possibilities for import-substitution. 
All vulnerability indices utilizing these variables come to the conclusion that there is a tendency 
for small states to be more economically vulnerable than other groups of countnes. 
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4. ECONOMIC RESILIENCE 
Economic resilience can be defined in many ways, but in this paper the term is used to refer to 
the ability to recover from or adjust to the negative impacts of external economic shocks. 
4.1 Usefulness of Considering Resilience Building 
The issue of resilience building is important for small states in view of the fact that such states 
tend to be inherently economically vulnerable, as already explained. In addition, the discussion 
on resil ience sheds light as to why a number of vulnerable small states have managed to do well 
economically in spite of (and not because of) being highly exposed to external shocks. 
Consideration of resilience building also conveys the message that vulnerable states should not 
be complacent in the face of their economic vulnerability, but could, and should, adopt policy 
measures to enable them to improve their ability to cope with external shocks. 
4.2 The Meaning of Economic Resilience 
Most dictionaries define resilience in terms of the ability to recover quickly from the effect of an 
adverse incident. This definition originates from the Latin resilire 'to leap back'. In economic 
literature, the term has been used in at least three senses relating to the ability (a) to recover 
quickly from a shock; (b) to withstand the effect of a shock; and (c) to avoid the shock 
altogether. 4 
A. Ab!Yity of an economy to recover quickly. This is associated with the flexibility of an economy 
enabling it to bounce back after being adversely affected by a shock. This ability will be severely 
limited if, for example, there is a chronic tendency for large fiscal deficits or htgh rates of 
unemployment. On the other hand, this ability will be enhanced when the economy possesses 
discretionary policy tools which it can utilize to counteract the effects of negative shocks, such as 
a strong fiscal position, which would entail that policy-makers can utilize discretionary 
expenditure or tax cuts to contrast the effects of negative shocks. This type of resilience is 
therefore associated with "shock-counteraction". 
8. Ability to withstand shocks. This suggests that the adverse effect of a shock could be absorbed 
or neutered, so that the end effect is zero or negligible. Th1s type of resilience occurs when the 
economy has in place mechanisms to endogenously react to negative shocks to reduce their 
effects, which we can refer to as "shock-absorption". For example, the existence of a flexible, 
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multi-skilled labor force could act as an instrument of shock absorption, as negative external 
demand shocks affecting a particular sector of economic activity can be relatively easily met by 
shifting resources to another sector enjoying stronger demand. 
C. Ability of an economy to avoid shocks. In this paper, this type of resilience is considered to be 
inherent, and can be considered as the obverse of economic vulnerability. 
5 . THE CONSTRUCTION OF A RESIUENCE INDEX 
5.1 Underlying difficulties 
In this section, we present the results of an attempt to construct a composite index of economic 
resilience. Some words of caution are warranted at this stage. The choice of variables as 
components of the index is somewhat subjective. However care was taken to base the choice on 
a set of desirable criteria related to (a) appropriate coverage, (b) simplicity and ease of 
comprehension, (c) affordability, (d) suitability for international comparisons and (e) 
transparency. A more detailed consideration of these criteria is given in Briguglio (2003). 
In addition, the summing of the components of the index also involves subjective choices, 
principally in selecting a weighting procedure. There is considerable debate in the literature on 
composite indices on this issue. Again, these questions are discussed in Briguglio (2003) and are 
not elaborated upon in this paper. 
The compilation of the index encountered a number of problems with regard to data collection, 
the most important of which were associated with (a) lack or shortage of data and (b) non-
homogenous definitions across countries. Briguglio (2003) considers these problems, referring to 
the fact that data problems occur particularly in the case of small states. 
5.2 The Components of the Resilience Index 
It is hypothesized that elements of shock-absorbing and shock-counteracting resilience in 
an economy can be found in the following areas: 
• macroeconomic stability 
• microeconomic market efficiency 
• good governance 
• social development 
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All of these areas feature variables which are highly influenced by economic policy and which can 
serve for an economy to build its economic resilience to meet the consequences of adverse 
shocks. 
Macroeconomic Stability 
Macroeconomic stability relates to the interaction between an economy's aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply. If aggregate expenditure in an economy moves in equilibrium with aggregate 
supply, the economy would be characterized by internal balance, as manifested in a sustainable 
fiscal position, low price inflation and an unemployment rate close to the natural rate, as well as 
by external balance as can be indicated by the international current account position or by the 
level of external debt. These can be all considered to be variables which are highly influenced by 
economic policy and which could act as good indicators of an economy's resilience in facing 
adverse shocks. 
The macroeconomic stability aspect of the resilience index is thus constructed on the basis of 
three variables namely: 
i. the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio, 
ii. the sum of the unemployment and inflation rates, and 
iii. The external debt to GDP ratio. 
The variables are available for a reasonably wide set of 102 countries spread over a spectrum of 
stages of development, size and geographical characteristics. The relative data and country 
ranking results are presented in Appendix 1. 
Fiscal deficit. The government budget position is suitable for inclusion in the resilience index 
because it is the result of fiscal policy, which is one of the main tools available to government, 
and indicates resilience of a shock-counteracting nature. This is because a healthy fiscal position 
would allow adjustments to taxation and expenditure policies in the face of adverse shocks. The 
fiscal deficit, standardized as a ratio to GDP, is thus included in the resilience index proposed in 
this paper. 
Inflation and unemployment. Price inflation and unemployment are also considered to be suitable 
indicators of resilience and at the same time they potentially provide additional information to 
that contained in the fiscal deficit variable. This is because price inflation and unemployment are 
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strongly influenced by other types of economic policy, including monetary and supply-side 
policies. They are associated with resilience because if an economy already has high levels of 
unemployment and inflation, it is likely that adverse shocks would impose significant costs on it. 
If on the other hand, the economy has low levels of inflation and unemployment, then it can 
withstand adverse shocks to these variables without excessive welfare costs. In this sense, 
therefore, unemployment and inflation indicate resilience of a shock-absorbing nature. The sum 
of these two variables, also known as the Economic Discomfort Index (or Economic Misery 
Index), is thus included in the resilience index proposed here. 
External Debt The adequacy of external policy may be gauged through the inclusion of the 
external debt to GDP ratio. This is considered to be a good measure of resilience, because a 
country with a low level of external debt may find it more difficult to mobilize resources in order 
to offset the effects of external shocks. Thus, this variable would indicate resilience of a shock-
counteracting nature. 5 
It may be surprising to observe that the United States is not among the first 10 placed in 
macroeconomic stability index, although it ranks at a relatively high place in the 12m position. On 
the other hand a number of small states, notably Hong Kong and Singapore, rank high on the 
index. In this regard, it is to be borne in mind that this is not an indicator of economic 
development but one that represents the ability of the macroeconomy to absorb or counteract 
adverse economic shocks. 
Microeconomic Market Efficiency 
The science of economics views markets and their efficient operation through the price 
mechanism, as the best way to allocate resources in the economy. If markets adjust rapidly to 
achieve equilibrium, then the effects of shocks can be easily absorbed in the economy and the 
relative adjustments be readily affected. If, on the other hand, market disequilibria tend to 
persist, especially in the face of adverse shocks, then resources will not be efficiently allocated in 
the economy, resulting in welfare costs, manifested, for instance, in outflows of capital, 
unemployed resources and waste or shortages in the goods markets. 
As an example, consider the case of financial markets. If, in the face of an adverse shock, 
markets respond efficiently by means of higher interest rates and lower asset prices, capital can 
be retained in the economy such that the adverse shocks are reflected in price variables rather 
than in the volume of physical investment which would have an important influence on economic 
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activity. If, on the other hand, prices in the financial markets fail to properly adjust, then it would 
be more likely for capital to leave the economy in the face of an adverse shock, thereby affecting 
economic activity and employment. Similar considerations may be made for the way in which the 
labor and product markets equilibrate in the economy. These issues would have important 
implications for resilience of the shock-absorbing type. 
There are not many available indicators of market efficiency which span a sufficiently wide range 
of countries as required for the purposes of this study. Following a search for suitable indicators, 
it was decided to use data contained in the Economic Freedom of the World Index published by 
the Fraser Institute. This is a project which commenced in 1986 led by Professor Milton 
Friedman, Rose Friedman and Michael Walker, and is aimed at measuring the extent to which 
markets are operating freely, competitively and efficiently in 123 countries. This index uses 
quantitative/objective data as well as data from independent surveys and indirectly attempts to 
assess the effects of 38 government policies affecting economic freedom. 
The index focuses on five major areas, with relative indicators, relating to the size of 
government, legal structure and security over property rights, access to sound money, freedom 
to trade internationally, and regulation of credit, labor and business. For the purposes of the 
microeconomic efficiency component the indicators selected are: 
i. the size of government, and; 
ii. freedom to trade internationally. 
These are chosen on the basis of their relevance to the resilience concept with regard to market 
efficiency. 
The size of government. The size of government is based on four indicators, namely (a) 
government consumption as a percentage of total consumption, subsidies and transfers as a 
percentage of GOP, and the share of investment accounted for by public entities; and (b) top 
marginal income tax rate together with the income threshold at which it applies. 
The share of government in the economy through consumption, investment and subsidies is 
considered to have a crowding-out effect on private sector involvement, thereby reduc1ng the 
degree of autonomous resilience which freely-operating markets can produce. 
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Similar considerations apply in the case of taxation, where the top marginal tax rate is viewed as 
the extent of disincentives to work present in an economy, which could preclude work effort from 
allowing an economy to recover from adverse shocks. 
Freedom to trade. The freedom to trade internationally considers the effects of revenues from 
tariffs, regulatory trade barriers, size of the trade sector, exchange rates and international capital 
market controls. In this paper, this is used as an indicator of the degree of interference by 
government in the international trade sector, which could preclude the economy from reacting 
flexibly to shocks by adjusting its patterns of international trade. 
The relative data and country ranking results are presented in Appendix 1. The data used in the 
index covered 2000 through 2002. Small wulnerable countries can be found across the entire 
scale of placing in this index. This indicates that such countries are adopting different policy 
approaches in terms of microeconomic efficiency towards meeting adverse shocks. 
Good governance 
Good governance is essential for an economic system to function properly and hence, to be 
resilient. Governance relates to issues such as rule of law and property rights. Without 
mechanisms of this kind in place, it would be relatively easy for adverse shocks to result in 
economic and social chaos and unrest. Hence the effects of vulnerability would be magnified. On 
the other hand, good governance can strengthen an economy's resilience. 
The Economic Freedom of the World Index has a component which is focused on legal structure 
and security of property rights. This is considered to be useful in the context of the present 
exercise in deriving an index of good governance. The Index covers the following indicators: 
i. judicial independence, 
ii. impartiality of courts, 
iii. the protection of intellectual property rights, 
iv. military interference in the rule of law; and 
v. political system and the integrity of the legal system. 
The relative data and country ranking results are presented in Appendix 1. The data used in the 
index covered 2000 through 2002. The highest rankings on the governance index are the more 
economically advanced countries, with the first five placings occupied by major industrialized 
economies. Singapore, which was among the most resilient economies on economic criteria, 
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ranks 14m in terms of governance. Vulnerable economies tend to obtain lower rankings on this 
count, but it still appears to be the case that the vulnerable economies enjoying a higher per 
capita GOP also tend to have better systems of governance. 
Social Development 
Social development is another essential component of economic resilience. This factor indicates 
the extent to which social relations in a society are properly developed, enabling an effective 
functioning of the economic apparatus without the hindrance of civil unrest. Social cohesion can 
also indicate the extent to which effective social dialogue takes place in an economy, which 
would in turn enable collaborative approaches towards the undertaking of corrective measures in 
the face of adverse shocks. It IS therefore hypothesized that social development is directly related 
to social cohesion, although this assertion cannot be tested empirically due to lack of data. 
Social development in a country can be measured in a number of ways. Variables relating to 
income such as its dispersion and the proportion of the population living in poverty, the long term 
unemployment rate, indicating the proportion of the population with low skills and inadequate 
employment prospects, and the proportion of the population with low level of education could be 
useful indicators. Still another possible approach would be to measure the number and extent of 
instances of industrial or civil unrest. These approaches are interesting but rather narrow in 
scope and very difficult to measure across countries. 
The index presented in this paper utilizes the education and health indicators used to construct 
the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2002; 2003; 2004). 
Education. Education, as measured by the adult literacy rate and school enrolment ratios, is 
considered to be a good indicator of social development. Education is considered to be strongly 
positively correlated with social advancement and hence, is indicative of a social fabric which is 
conducive to economic resilience. 
Health. Life expectancy at birth, which is the health indicator in the HOI, is considered to be 
suitable for measuring the health aspects in society. This in turn is likely to be related to medical 
facilities, housing and degree of proneness to accident or risk of injury. Again, high life-
expectancy is considered to be conducive to economic resilience. 
The relative data and country ranking results are presented in Appendix 1. The data used in the 
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index relate to 2000 through 2002. The social advancement index is very strongly correlated with 
the degree of economic development, with the countries in the first 20 places on the index 
having an annual per capita GDP of at least US$11,500. Small island states, including those with 
a high per capita GDP, rank from the 25tn position downwards. 
Correlation between the Components of the Index 
The variables discussed above have been found to be positively related to each other, as shown 
in Table 1, but the correlation is somewhat weak, with the exception of good governance and 
social development. 
Macroeconomic 
Market Efficiency 
Good Governance 
Social Development 
Table 1 
Correlation Matrix 
1 
0.18 1 
0.29 0.02 
0.21 0.11 
1 
0.66 1 
The question arises therefore as to whether or not the social development index is redundant, 
given that its high correlation with good governance. Given that the correlation is not unduly 
high, it was decided to retain both components in the composite index. 
Other Determinants of Economic Resilience 
Economic resilience can also be viewed to be determined by a plethora of other factors apart 
from those mentioned above. 
It may be argued, for example, that it could be useful to consider the effects of environmental 
management on economic resilience. The environment can be an important source of 
vulnerability by giving rise to shocks of an adverse nature, be they rapid events, such as 
earthquakes or in the form of a gradual degradation over time. In turn, these would have 
important repercussions on the economy and society. In this regard, the efforts being undertaken 
to compile the Environmental Sustainability Index (Esty et al, 2005) are commendable. Data on 
these factors are however not readily and extensively available across countries of different 
sizes,6 such that the utilization of this index within the present exercise would have significantly 
reduced the countries covered by the resilience index. 
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In addition, there is the possibility that incorporating an environmental management index could 
lead to the problem of redundancy i.e. using indicators which are highly correlated which would 
add no new information but would render the procedure unnecessary complex. In the case of the 
environmental management factors, the socio-economic resilience aspects covered by the 
variables discussed above are likely to be highly correlated with environmental management, 
although in the absence of data, this assertion cannot be tested. 
5.3 The Resilience Index 
The index was computed by taking a simple average of the four components just described, 
namely: 
(a) macroeconomic stability 
(b) microeconomic market efficiency 
(c) good governance 
(d) social development 
All observations of the components were standardized using the well know transformation: 
XSij = (Xij - Minj ) / (Maxj - Minj ) 
where: XSij is the value of the standardized observation i of variable j ; 
Xij is the actual value of the same observation; 
Minj and Maxj are the minimum and maximum values of variable j . 
This transforms the values of observations in a particular variable array so that they take a range 
of values from 0 to 1. 
The results of the averaging of the four components are shown m Appendix 1. The results show 
that the countries with the highest GDP per capita, are, as expected, those with the highest 
resilience scores, as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 about here 
The Relation between GOP per Capita, Resilience and Vulnerability 
An interesting finding that GDP per capita of the different countries is to a very high extent 
explained by vulnerability and resilience. Using the OLS method of regression, GDP per capita 
(standardized as explained above) was regressed on the vulnerability index (as proposed in 
Briguglio and Galea, 2003: See Appendix 3) and on the resilience index produced in this study. 
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The results are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Regression Results 
G = -.10 + .83 R - .13V 
Tstats -(1.8) (9.9) - (1.8) 
R2 = 0.56 
N= 87 
Where: G = GDP per capita; R = Resilience Index; and V = Vulnerability Index 
All variables have been standardized as explained above, so that their values range between 0 and 1 
This result confirms the hypothesis in Briguglio (2004) and Cordina (2004a and 2004b) that the 
performance of countries depends on their inherent vulnerability and their nurtured resilience. 
This is not an extraordinary finding, because it validates a very plausible assumption. However 
the results of the regression exercise has some interesting implications. In particular, the results 
show that the economic well-being of nations is more dependent on man-made policies rather 
than on inherent vulnerabilities. The results also confirm that adequate policy approaches can be 
used to successfully overcome the handicaps posed by vulnerability. 
5.4 The Scenarios 
Going back to the scenarios proposed in Figure 1, it is possible to place the countries included in 
the index in the four quadrants shown in therein, using the resilience index proposed in this 
paper and the vulnerability index presented by Briguglio and Galea (2003). The results are shown 
in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 about here 
It should be pointed out here that the cut-off values (represented by the dashed lines in Figure 
4) chosen for the quadrants are the averages of the vulnerability and resilience scores for all 
countries. This decision is subjective and the classification of countries will change if different 
cut-off points are chosen. Consequently it was decided to allow a "border-line" margin of +/-15% 
for the resilience index (shown by the semi-transparent rectangle) and countries falling within 
this margm are classified as 'borderline' cases. 
Appendix 2 shows which countries have been classified w1thin the different quadrants. 
14 
The overall tendencies that can be derived from Appendix 2 are that: 
(a) countries which fall in the "best-case" quadrant include the relatively large countries with a 
relatively high GDP per capita and with relatively low vulnerability scores. 
(b) countries which fall in the "self-made" quadrant include a number of small states with a high 
vulnerability score. 
(c) countries which fall in the "prodigal son" quadrant include relatively large countries and 
others with a low resilience score. 
(d) countries which fall in the "worst case" quadrant include some small countries with relatively 
high vulnerability and low resilience scores. 
6. THE USES OF THE RESILIENCE INDEX 
Supporting decision-making, setting targets and establishing standards 
Decision-making by the government and other authorities should lead to action which is 
systematic and coherent and based on transparent information. The Resilience Index may also be 
used to set the direction of action and to justify certain priorities. The index could also be useful 
for setting targets. For example, a country with low resilience scores in certain economic areas 
may set targets to step up 1ts resilience with regard to that economic variable. 
Monitoring and evaluating developments 
Indices are of utmost importance to assess whether a given policy or decision is yielding the 
desired results and to assess whether changes of direction are needed. This is especially so if 
measured over time. In this way, decisions are not taken blindly or based only on hunches and 
feelings, but would be based on scientific information presented in index format. 
Deriving quantitative estimates 
An index summarizes complex phenomena, often yieldmg a single-value measure of the 
phenomena under consideration. This is useful, if not essential, for donor countries and 
organizations when taking decisions regardmg the allocation of financial and technical assistance, 
or for assigning special status to vulnerable countries. 
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Dissemination of information and drawing attention to the issue 
The resilience index can be used to make the public more aware of certain problems, and to give 
high profiles to certain trends which can strengthen resilience. In this regard, indices can be 
used for communication and for alerting stakeholders about issues, including dangers, failures 
and success stories. 
An index is a very good instrument for drawing attention to the issue being investigated. Thus for 
example, the exercise of computing an index of resilience may itself make decision-makers aware 
of the gravity of these problems. Such an exercise may also generate academic discussion and 
enhance awareness amongst scholars on the issues involved. 
Focusing the discussion 
Indices can help to develop a common language for discussion. One often finds that persons 
engaged in debate go off at tangents because of lack of common definitions. In the case of 
indices, the quantification of its components requires precise definitions, and this could help focus 
the discussion on matters directly relevant to the issue. 
Promoting the idea of integrated action 
Composite indices are generally constructed to measure multifaceted realities. This could help to 
foster an awareness of the interconnections between the components of the index. In the case of 
economic resilience, for example, it is often not enough, and may even be counterproductive, to 
take action in one area in isolation from others. The resilience index proposed in this paper could 
therefore promote the need for an integrated action in this regard. 
7 . CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS 
This paper dealt with conceptual and methodological aspects associated with economic resilience 
and its measurement. The index developed in this paper covers four areas of economic resilience 
namely macroeconomic stability, mlcroeconomic market efficiency, governance and social 
cohesion. Each of these areas contain variables which are considered suitable to gauge the 
extent to which the policy framework is conducive to absorb and counteract the effects of 
economic shocks. 
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The results of this exercise can provide an explanation as to why inherently vulnerable countries 
may register high levels of GNP per capita. It is argued that countries may be economically 
successful because they are inherently not vulnerable, or because they are resilient in the face of 
the vulnerability they face. The obverse is also true, in that countries may be unsuccessful 
because they are not sufficiently resilient. 
The paper has also shown that GDP per capita is positively related to economic resilience and 
negatively related to inherent economic vulnerability. Furthermore, per capita GDP is found to be 
more sensitive to resilience than to vulnerability. 
The index produced in this study is very preliminary, and the work should be considered as still at 
an early stage of development. The results should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. In this study, the words state and country are used synonymously. There is no generally 
agreed definition of what variable should be used to measure the size of countries and as 
to what should be the cut-off point between a small country and other countries. 
Generally speaking, population is used as an indicator of size. In this study, a country 
with a population of 1.5 million or less is considered to be a small one. 
2. This finding is reported in many studies. See for example Briguglio (1995). 
3. Farrugia (2004) elaborated further on these ideas by considering the economic strength 
of trading partners as a proxy for the probability of shocks to exports. 
4. An analogy relating to an attack of influenza virus may help explain the three senses in 
which the term "resilience" has been used. A person exposed to the virus may (a) get 
infected but recovers quickly; (b) withstand the effect of the virus, possibly by being 
immunized and (c) avoid the virus altogether by staying away from infection sources. 
5. It is however to be stated that certain countries may have external debt not because of a 
weak policy framework but due to a highly-developed international financial activity. This 
is a recognised weakness in the use of this indicator. However the inclusion of other 
variables related to market efficiency and governance would to an extent "correct" this 
weakness, since these variables either exacerbate the effect of external debt in the 
presence of a weak policy framework or counteract it otherwise. 
6. Esty et al (2005) do produce some results for a few small states but they were reluctant 
to include them in the Environmental Sustainability Index. 
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APPENDIX 1: DATA AND COUNTRY RANKING RESULTS 
Country Macroeconomic Microeconomic Social Good Resilience Country 
stability market development governance Index Ranking 
efficiency 
Albania 0.281 0.198 0.782 0.331 0.398 73 
Argentina 0.553 0.511 0.877 0.242 0.546 49 
Australia 0.494 0.500 0.989 0.990 0.743 12 
Austria 0.706 0.399 0.959 0.940 0.751 9 
Bangladesh 0.650 0.457 0.278 0.117 0.376 78 
Barbados 0.647 0.000 0.921 0.539 0.527 53 
Belgium 0.676 0.422 0.984 0.791 0.718 14 
Belize 0.220 0.253 0.771 0.545 0.447 68 
Bolivia 0.490 0.573 0.646 0.095 0.451 67 
Brazil 0.414 0.375 0.741 0.380 0.478 61 
Cameroon 0.466 0.239 0.286 0.280 0.318 83 
Canada 0.648 0.560 0.978 0.924 0.778 6 
Chile 0.651 0.564 0.869 0.567 0.663 21 
China 0.668 0.209 0.725 0.388 0.497 59 
Colombia 0.442 0.232 0.771 0.147 0.398 74 
Costa Rica 0.625 0.616 0.864 0.589 0.674 19 
Cote d'Iv01re 0.446 0.402 0.071 0.198 0.279 87 
Croatia 0.544 0.121 0.837 0.462 0.491 60 
Cyprus 0.387 0.302 0.894 0.645 0.557 47 
Czech Republic 0.589 0.418 0.866 0.603 0.619 29 
Denmark 0.728 0.314 0.948 0.998 0.747 11 
Dominican Republic 0.671 0.580 0.678 0.253 0.546 50 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.605 0.370 0.540 0.392 0.477 63 
El Salvador 0.670 0.719 0.670 0.288 0.587 38 
Estonia 0.650 0.612 0.861 0.583 0.677 17 
Finland 0.653 0.372 0.973 1.000 0.750 10 
France 0.515 0.183 0.965 0.736 0.600 34 
Germany 0.570 0.410 0.951 0.929 0.715 15 
Greece 0.402 0.489 0.935 0.482 0.577 42 
Honduras 0.449 0.556 0.613 0.092 0.428 72 
Hong Kong, China 0.665 1.000 0.875 0.687 0.807 3 
Hungary 0.459 0.455 0.842 0.636 0.598 35 
Iceland 0.734 0.370 0.970 0.942 0.754 8 
India 0.522 0.404 0.439 0.504 0.467 65 
Indonesia 0.444 0.581 0.659 0.150 0.459 66 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.612 0.285 0.657 0.504 0.514 57 
Ireland 0.759 0.620 0.932 0.866 0.794 4 
Israel 0.615 0.169 0.937 0.756 0.619 28 
Italy 0.582 0.384 0.935 0.729 0.657 23 
Jamaica 0.429 0.592 0.798 0.409 0.557 46 
Japan 0.495 0.335 0.975 0.730 0.634 25 
Jordan 0.414 0.334 0.747 0.623 0.529 52 
Kenya 0.510 0.481 0.349 0.189 0.382 77 
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Kuwait 0.597 0.444 0.766 0.653 0.615 30 
Latvia 0.542 0.412 0.837 0.519 0.578 41 
Lithuania 0.567 0.439 0.858 0.431 0.574 43 
Luxembourg 0.204 0.469 0.902 0.883 0.615 31 
Madagascar 0.389 0.377 0.308 0.237 0.328 81 
Malaysia 0.743 0.450 0.766 0.533 0.623 26 
Malta 0.506 0.344 0.880 0.679 0.602 33 
Mauritius 0.618 0.531 0.722 0.619 0.623 27 
Mexico 0.623 0.628 0.793 0.231 0.569 44 
Morocco 0.517 0.235 0.447 0.539 0.434 71 
Nepal 0.513 0.226 0.313 0.338 0.347 80 
Netherlands 0.504 0.446 0.981 0.988 0.730 13 
New Zealand 0.703 0.629 0.975 0.948 0.814 2 
Nicaragua 0.064 0.488 0.597 0.151 0.325 82 
Nigeria 0.494 0.342 0.286 0.146 0.317 84 
Norway 0.575 0.282 0.984 0.876 0.679 16 
Pakistan 0.420 0.303 0.262 0.165 0.287 86 
Panama 0.600 0.607 0.820 0.348 0.594 36 
Papua New Guinea 0.529 0.350 0.341 0.261 0.370 79 
Paraguay 0.596 0.616 0.749 0.071 0.508 58 
Peru 0.586 0.609 0.757 0.235 0.547 48 
Philippines 0.474 0.574 0.787 0.244 0.520 55 
Poland 0.587 0.334 0.883 0.525 0.582 39 
Portugal 0.612 0.415 0.921 0.748 0.674 18 
Romania 0.414 0.205 0.782 0.360 0.440 69 
Russian Federation 0.537 0.340 0.768 0.263 0.477 62 
Senegal 0.428 0.379 0.134 0.273 0.303 85 
Singapore 1.000 0.844 0.886 0.884 0.903 1 
Slovak Republic 0.469 0.342 0.842 0.497 0.538 51 
Slovenia 0.674 0.115 0.910 0.618 0.579 40 
South Africa 0.594 0.392 0.485 0.597 0.517 56 
Spam 0.564 0.407 0.970 0.627 0.642 24 
Sri Lanka 0.347 0.478 0.768 0.286 0.470 64 
Sweden 0.496 0.243 1.000 0.926 0.666 20 
Switzerland 0.575 0.649 0.954 0.923 0.775 7 
Thailand 0.424 0.548 0.752 0.548 0.568 45 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.656 0.434 0.796 0.530 0.604 32 
Tunisia 0.531 0.264 0.676 0.624 0.524 54 
Turkey 0.042 0.513 0.698 0.328 0.395 75 
Uganda 0.536 0.481 0.256 0.303 0.394 76 
United Kingdom 0.101 0.601 0.973 0.975 0.663 22 
United States 0.661 0.650 0.948 0.903 0.791 5 
Uruguay 0.543 0.456 0.883 0.483 0.591 37 
Venezuela, RB 0.531 0.427 0.793 0.000 0.438 70 
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APPENDIX 2: THE FOUR SCENARIOS 
Country Resilienc e Vulnerability Case Borderline 
Index Index 
Singapore 1.000 0.971 Self made 
Estonia 0.637 0.908 Self made 
Kuwait 0.538 0.731 Self made 
Hong Kong 0.845 0.713 Self made 
Maurit ius 0.550 0.632 Self made 
Luxembourg 0.538 0.615 Self made 
Iceland 0.761 0.607 Self made 
Malaysia 0.551 0.587 Self made 
Norway 0.641 0.543 Self made 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.521 0.533 Self made 
Israel 0.545 0.443 Self made 
Malta 0.518 1.000 Self made Borderline 
Panama 0.504 0.837 Self made Borderline 
Latvia H 0.478 0.718 Self made Borderline 
Greece 0.477 0.655 Self made Borderline 
Lithuania 0.472 0.466 Self made Borderline 
Costa Rica 0.632 0.436 Best case 
Denmark 0.749 0.407 Best case 
Belgium 0.704 0.384 Best case 
Chile 0.615 0.379 Best case 
Ireland 0.825 0.371 Best case 
Netherlands 0.722 0.364 Best case 
New Zealand 0.857 0.320 Best case 
Czech Republic 0.545 0.309 Best case 
Finland 0.754 0.286 Best case 
Spain 0.581 0.250 Best case 
Portugal 0.633 0.242 Best case 
Austria 0.756 0.216 Best case 
Sweden 0.620 0.208 Best case 
Australia 0.744 0.184 Best case 
Switzerland 0.795 0.178 Best case 
canada 0.799 0.117 Best case 
Japan 0.568 0.106 Best case 
United Kingdom 0.614 0.106 Best case 
Germany 0.698 0.100 Best case 
Italy 0.606 0.082 Best case 
United States 0.819 0.060 Best case 
Thailand 0.463 0.363 Best case Borderline 
El Salvador 0.493 0.362 Best case Borderline 
Slovenia 0.481 0.307 Best case Borderline 
Hungary 0.511 0.294 Best case Borderline 
Uruguay 0.500 0.288 Best case Borderline 
Poland 0.486 0.175 Best case Borderline 
France 0.514 0.129 Best case Borderline 
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Mexico 0.464 0.046 Best case Borderline 
Belize 0.269 0.768 Worst case 
Nigeria 0.061 0.677 Worst case 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.317 0.658 Worst case 
Uganda 0.184 0.597 Worst case 
Nicaragua 0.074 0.578 Worst case 
Honduras 0.238 0.534 Worst case 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.000 0.524 Worst case 
Kenya 0.165 0.511 Worst case 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.377 0.508 Worst case 
Papua New Guinea 0.146 0.508 Worst case 
Croatia 0.340 0.480 Worst case 
Venezuela, RB 0.254 0.465 Worst case 
Madagascar 0.078 0.465 Worst case 
Senegal 0.039 0.464 Worst case 
Jamaica 0.446 0.922 Worst case Borderline 
Cyprus 0.445 0.840 Worst case Borderline 
Dominican Republic 0.427 0.768 Worst case Borderline 
Jordan 0.401 0.725 Worst case Borderline 
Barbados 0.397 0.717 Worst case Borderline 
Philippines 0.386 0.485 Worst case Borderline 
Sri Lanka 0.306 0.415 Prodigal son 
Cameroon 0.062 0.397 Prodigal son 
Pakistan 0.013 0.349 Prodigal son 
Albania 0.191 0.344 Prodigal son 
Nepal 0.109 0.327 Prodigal son 
Bangladesh 0.155 0.313 Prodigal son 
Bolivia 0.276 0.299 Prodigal son 
Paraguay 0.367 0.297 Prodigal son 
Morocco 0.249 0.272 Prodigal son 
Colombia 0.191 0.254 Prodigal son 
Russian Federation 0.318 0.241 Prodigal son 
Romania 0.258 0.206 Prodigal son 
India 0.301 0.201 Prodigal son 
Turkey 0.186 0.182 Prodigal son 
Indonesia 0.288 0.174 Prodigal son 
Brazil 0.318 0.001 Prodigal son 
China 0.350 0.000 Prodigal son 
Tunisia 0.392 0.426 Prodigal son Borderline 
Slovak Republic 0.414 0.357 Prodigal son Borderline 
Peru 0.429 0.242 Prodigal son Borderline 
South Africa 0.381 0.147 Prodigal son Borderline 
Argentina 0.428 0.100 Prodigal son Borderline 
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APPENDIX 3: THE BRIGUGLIO AND GALEA VULNERABILITY INDEX 
Country Vulnerability Country 
Index Ranking 
Albania 0.263 50 
Argentina 0.077 81 
Australia 0.141 71 
Austria 0.166 67 
Bangladesh 0.240 53 
Barbados 0.549 12 
Belgium 0.294 42 
Belize 0.588 7 
Bolivia 0.229 56 
Brazil 0.001 86 
Cameroon 0.304 41 
Canada 0.089 78 
Chile 0.290 43 
China 0.000 87 
Colombia 0.194 62 
Costa Rica 0.334 37 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.401 26 
Croatia 0.368 31 
Cyprus 0.643 5 
Czech Republic 0.236 54 
Denmark 0.311 40 
Dominican Republic 0.588 8 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.504 15 
El Salvador 0.277 47 
Estonia 0.695 4 
Finland 0.219 60 
France 0.099 77 
Germany 0.076 82 
Greece 0.501 16 
Honduras 0.409 24 
Hong Kong, China 0.546 13 
Hungary 0.225 58 
Iceland 0.465 19 
India 0.154 70 
Indonesia 0.133 75 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.389 28 
Ireland 0.284 44 
Israel 0.339 36 
Italy 0.062 83 
Jamaica 0.706 3 
Japan 0.081 79 
Jordan 0.555 10 
Kenya 0.391 27 
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Kuwait 0.560 9 
Latvia 0.550 11 
Lithuania 0.357 32 
Luxembourg 0.471 18 
Madagascar 0.356 34 
Malaysia 0.449 21 
Malta 0.765 1 
Mauritius 0.484 17 
Mexico 0.035 85 
Morocco 0.208 61 
Nepal 0.250 51 
Netherlands 0.279 45 
New Zealand 0.245 52 
Nicaragua 0.442 22 
Nigeria 0.518 14 
Norway 0.416 23 
Pakistan 0.267 49 
Panama 0.640 6 
Papua New Guinea 0.389 29 
Paraguay 0.227 57 
Peru 0.186 64 
Philippines 0.371 30 
Poland 0.134 74 
Portugal 0.185 65 
Romania 0.158 69 
Russian Federation 0.184 66 
Senegal 0.355 35 
Singapore 0.743 2 
Slovak Republic 0.273 48 
Slovenia 0.235 55 
South Africa 0.113 76 
Spain 0.192 63 
Sri Lanka 0.318 39 
Sweden 0.159 68 
Switzerland 0.136 73 
Thailand 0.278 46 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.408 25 
Tunisia 0.326 38 
Turkey 0.140 72 
Uganda 0.457 20 
United Kingdom 0.081 80 
United States 0.046 84 
Uruguay 0.221 59 
Venezuela, RB 0.356 33 
Source: BrigugliO and Galea (2003) 
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